



ISGS 2016

# Are your keys safe?

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## *Cryptographic keys terms definition*

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# Keys ?

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### **Encryption keys**

- asymmetric e.g. RSA, ECC public/private **key** pairs for wrapping
- symmetric e.g. AES, RC4, 3DES **keys**

### **Signature keys**

- asymmetric e.g. DSA, ECDSA public/private **key** pairs for signing (of object hashes)
- hash algorithms e.g. SHA-2, SHA-3

### **Certificates**

- digitally signed **public keys**



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# Where are cryptographic keys used?

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- ❖ Web server authentication (e.g. https), “SSL” certificates, EV-certificates
- ❖ VPN client and concentrator authentication (IPSEC, SSL VPN)
- ❖ Email signatures (S/MIME)
- ❖ Data volume encryption (e.g. MS virtual smart card)
- ❖ Document signing
- ❖ SQL server
- ❖ Service authentication (mail - mail server, ssh, sDNS,...)

# Definition “certificate”

- ❖ In general a certificate is an object, which a trusted entity certifies its origin or contents
- ❖ a “digital certificate” typically refers to a
  - ❖ “public key”
  - ❖ subject unique information (e.g. [securosys.ch](https://www.securosys.ch))
  - ❖ issuer unique information (e.g. VeriSign)
  - ❖ validity period
  - ❖ “digital signature”

Public

Subject identifier: [securosys.ch](https://www.securosys.ch)

Issuer identifier: [chsign.com](https://www.chsign.com)

Subject public key, e.g. RSA  
4096

“checksum” = hash of above

Issuer signature, e.g. RSA 4096

Issuer signature validation key,  
e.g. RSA 4096

Secured

Subject private key

Issuer signature key

Special case example: Digital signature


# “qualifizierte” elektronische Signatur

Equivalent to personal hand written  
signature

==> legally binding contracts

Codified in ZertES (SR 943.02), equivalent  
codifications in all EU countries [3]

Requires a certified certificate issuing  
device (CC EAL4+, FIPS140-2 L3, or  
equivalent) and audited procedures  
(CP/CPS)



*Example: Smart card login*


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# Two factor login

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Certificate and private key stored on smart card

Pin “stored” in user’s brain to unlock smart card



# Web server “SSL” certificate store

Example: Web server


- Apache
  - file system
- nginx
  - file system
- MS IIS
  - certificate store

```
<VirtualHost 192.168.0.1:443>
DocumentRoot /var/www/html2
ServerName www.yourdomain.com
SSLEngine on
SSLCertificateFile /path/to/your_domain_name.crt
SSLCertificateKeyFile /path/to/your_private.key
SSLCertificateChainFile /path/to/DigiCertCA.crt
</VirtualHost>
```

```
server {
listen 443;

ssl on;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/certs/your_domain_name.crt;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/your_domain_name.key;

server_name your.domain.com;
access_log /var/log/nginx/nginx.vhost.access.log;
error_log /var/log/nginx/nginx.vhost.error.log;
location / {
root /home/www/public_html/your.domain.com/public;
index index.html;
}
}
```




Example Microsoft storage encryption


# Virtual smart card

Stores keys on hard drive

- User key (possibly stored in TPM)
- Smart card key, which is encrypted by the storage root key
- Authorization key for the user key decryption, which is encrypted by the public portion of the smart card key







*Example keys in a virtual private network setup*

# VPN keys

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# How are my keys protected ?

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- ❖ Different OS have different strategies
  - ❖ By software encryption (but where is the encryption key stored ?)
  - ❖ Trusted platform module (just one per machine)
- ❖ **Software cannot protect your keys**
  - ❖ A trust anchor is required

# Do I care? What are the risks?

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- ❖ **Loss of “qualifiziertes Zertifikat”, “geregeltes Zertifikat” signature certificate private key**
  - ❖ Legally binding signatures can be issued
- ❖ **Loss of communication certificate private keys**
  - ❖ interception possibility (eaves dropping, man in the middle)
  - ❖ potentially conflict with data protection laws
- ❖ **Loss of storage keys**
  - ❖ loss of intellectual property,
  - ❖ business continuity cost (e.g. after loss of credit card holder data)
  - ❖ potentially conflict with data protection laws
- ❖ **Loss of “SSL” certificate private key (e.g. EV certificate)**
  - ❖ Web site, email impersonation => attack vector
  - ❖ Risk for reputation with customers / partners

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# Linux (and various Unix)

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- ❖ Keys are protected by user / group file permissions
  - ❖ privileged users (e.g. “root”) can access everything
- ❖ Keys are typically stored in files, e.g. in users home directory

```
dasen$ ls -al .ssh
drwx----- 1 dasen staff 264 Jan 27 2015 .
drwxr-xr-x+ 1 dasen staff 1792 May 12 16:21 ..
-rw----- 1 dasen staff 1766 Jan 27 2015 id_rsa
-rw-r--r-- 1 dasen staff 400 Jan 27 2015 id_rsa.pub
```


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# Microsoft

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- ❖ Keys are stored encrypted in
  - ❖ file system for standalone,
  - ❖ user profile for domain
- ❖ Encryption key per user (user master key)
  - ❖ rolled over regularly
  - ❖ stored in profile encrypted with logon password and user SID.

# MS Key Storage Provider (KSP)



[1]

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# MS CNG private key storage

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Key type	Directory
User private	%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys
Local system private	%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\SystemKeys
Local service private	%WINDIR%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService
Network service private	%WINDIR%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService
Shared private	%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys

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# Keychain on OSX

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- ❖ Keys (certificates, passwords, etc.) are stored via the keychain application
- ❖ The keychain is located in the users profile directory
  - ❖ `~/Library/Keychains`
- ❖ Keychains are encrypted with password derived keys
- ❖ Login key chain can be accessed with “root” privileges



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# The trust anchor

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HSM is a Trust Anchor

Generates trusted certificates and keys

Safeguards keys = Key storage




Different form factors

Hardware security module (performance)


Smartcard (portability)



# Integration of a trust anchor



# Multiple applications, one trust anchor



# Generating and managing keys

- ❖ Use a secure key generation device (HSM)
  - ❖ Hardware random number generator
  - ❖ Validated encryption algorithms
- ❖ Keep private keys in protected storage
  - ❖ Hardware security module
- ❖ Use a Software CA or Windows built-in CA



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## reverse proxies – nginx – Apache

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*Example HSM with open source*

- ❖ To use an HSM, PKCS#11 API support is required. PKCS#11 library is vendor specific.
- ❖ Configure OpenSSL Engines library to use vendor PKCS#11 interface.
- ❖ Simplified support via “libp11”

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# Microsoft IIS

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*Example HSM with Windows server*

- ❖ Microsoft supports a unified API for crypto operations via CNG (CryptoAPI next gen)
- ❖ CNG provider is vendor specific
- ❖ Key storage is implemented via a key storage provider (KSP)
  - ❖ MS default is an “isolated” process
  - ❖ Protected hardware can be attached by installing specific KSP
- ❖ IIS will use standard APIs.

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# Summary

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- ❖ Digital keys are a crucial part of the digital world.
- ❖ Keys must be safeguarded. You want to know, where and when they are accessed
- ❖ Keys are trusted if generated with a trustworthy key generator.
- ❖ For trust you need a physical trust anchor.



## References

1. [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb204778\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb204778(v=vs.85).aspx)
2. <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb895340.aspx>
3. Botschaft zur Totalrevision des Bundesgesetzes über die elektronische Signatur (ZertES)
4. <http://nginx.org>



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